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Abstract 
 
The paper is a response to the question why analytic philosophy, which dominated 
philosophical Faculties in the English-speaking world, exerted virtually no influence on 
historical thought and writing in Germany. It examines major historiographical trends in 
Germany from the beginnings of history as an academic discipline in the nineteenth century 
to the present: the anti-democratic, nationalist tradition with its focus on politics and 
diplomacy associated with Historismus, which dominated German historical writing until 
after World War II, the democratically and socially oriented “historical social science” 
(Historische Sozialwissennschaft) of the 1960s and 1970s, committed to the analysis of 
social structures and historical processes, and the “history of everyday life” 
(Alltagsgeschichte) which aimed at a “history from below”. Yet what made analytic 
philosophy unacceptable to all these trends was that it proceeded in an abstract logical 
manner which neglected the concrete context in which historical explanation takes place. 
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Resumen 
 
 Este artículo es una respuesta a la pregunta de por qué la filosofía analítica, que ha 
dominado las Facultades de Filosofía en el mundo angloparlante, no ha ejercido 
practicamente ninguna influencia en el pensamiento histórico y en la historiografía 
alemanas. Se examinan las principales corrientes historiográficas alemanas desde los 
comienzos de la Historia como disciplina académica en el siglo XIX hasta la actualidad: la 
tradición antidemocrática y nacionalista, centrada en la política y la diplomacia, asociada al 
Historicismo (Historismus), que dominó la historiografía germana hasta después de la 
                                                 

 This paper was held at the conference “Philosophy, Theory and History in Germany since 1945”, taken 
place in Bochum (Germany), September 15-16, 2014. 
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Segunda Guerra Mundial; la “historia-ciencia social”, orientada social y democráticamente 
(Historische Sozialwissennschaft), de las décadas de los sesenta y setenta del siglo XX, 
comprometida con el análisis de las estructuras sociales y los procesos históricos; y la 
“historia de los cotidiano” (Alltagsgeschichte) dirigida a la “historia desde abajo”. Sin 
embargo, lo que hizo inaceptable la filosofía analítica a todas estas corrientes fue el hecho 
de que aquella procedía de uno modo lógico-abstracto, desatendiendo el contexto concreto 
en el que tienen lugar las explicaciones históricas. 
 
Palabras clave 
 
Ranke, Droysen, Meinecke, Abusch, Wehler, Historicismo, Historia-ciencia social, historia 
de lo cotidiano. 
 
 
 
What is Meant by Analytic Philosophy? 
 
Before we can begin to discuss this question we must arrive at some sort of a 
definition of what is meant by analytic philosophy. Michael Beaney in his Introduction to 
The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy avoids a definition, perhaps 
rightly because of the diversity among the philosophers identified with the school, and 
instead prefers to provide a history of the analytic tradition as the only way to answer the 
question “What is analytic philosophy?”1 Nevertheless, there is a certain consensus about 
the ways in which the early advocates who were later identified with analytic philosophy 
understood their position, theorists forming a circle in Cambridge including Bertrand 
Russell, G. E. Moore, Ludwig Wittgenstein and others, influenced by the German logician 
of mathematics Gottlob Frege, and slightly later the circle in Vienna around Moritz Schlick, 
Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, and Karl Popper, who, except for Schlick who was murdered 
in 1936, fled from Austria to English speaking countries after the Nazi seizure of Austria 
and merged with the Cambridge group. The key principle for both circles is “that there are 
no specifically philosophical truths and that the object of philosophy is the logical 
clarification of thoughts”.2 Logical positivism was often identified with analytic philosophy 
and for both “only statements verifiable either logically or empirically would be cognitively 
meaningful”.3 This meant for both a clear rejection of metaphysics and the reduction of 
aesthetics and ethics to matters of taste or choice which elude philosophical analysis. And 
this requires linguistic clarity, ideally a language which is free of ambiguities. It also 
involves a rejection of history. Science for them is not concerned with the history of its 
findings but with empirical validity and logical consistency. 
  
                                                 
1
 Michael Beaney, Introduction to The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 29. See also his chapter 2, “The historiography of analytic philosophy”, 30-
60. Judging by the index in the 1,184 pages of the book, not a single historian is mentioned. 
2
 Anthony J.P. Kenny, Wittgenstein (London: Penguin, 1973), 230. 
3
 Cited in Wikipedia, “Logical Positivism”, 1, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_positivism [accessed on 1 
June 2015].  
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Although logical positivism was at an early stage often identified with it, analytical 
philosophy ultimately went in other directions. Yet in practice there was a difference which 
went beyond the stress of analytic philosophy on logically and of logical positivism on 
empirically verifiable truth.
4
 In the course of time philosophers who identified themselves 
with analytic philosophy began to concern themselves with the above named topics, 
including religion, literature, and even Marxism, which had once been avoided. This 
justifies Michael Beane’s decision to deal with an intellectual tradition rather than a well 
defined philosophy. Yet although the title of the Oxford Handbook suggests that it presents 
the historiography of analytic philosophy, in fact it consists of a series of isolated articles 
about individual thinkers with little consideration of the historical context in which they 
formulated their thought. It seems that the Handbook was written by philosophers for 
philosophers who tend to think that the historical context is of secondary importance. 
Because of the highly abstract nature of this thought, it has had little to offer to the 
practicing historian. There is in fact no chapter dealing with the question how basic 
concepts of analytic philosophic methods are actually applied to historical writing. In the 
index of the 1,161 page Handbook, not a single historian is mentioned. It is not surprising 
that historians in the German tradition, with whom we are dealing in this paper, either took 
no notice of analytical philosophy or misunderstood it as a form of positivism. In the last 
several decades analytical philosophy has come to dominate philosophy departments in the 
English-speaking world and to a lesser extent also elsewhere, but has received little 
attention from historians. 
 
Two Approaches to Historical Theory and their Relation to Analytic Philosophy 
 
We shall distinguish between two categories of theorists, those who deal with 
questions of historical theory in the abstract with little concrete application to historical 
writing, and another category of practicing historians, who implicitly operate with 
theoretical assumptions without necessarily spelling them out. In this section we shall deal 
with three theorists of the first category. 
 
They share with analytic philosophy the concern with the basic concepts employed in 
historical writing without analyzing historical writing directly. Three very recent works of 
this first category come to mind:  Frank Ankersmit’s Meaning, Truth, and Reference in 
Historical Representation (2012),
5
 Jörn Rüsen, Historik: Theorie der 
Geschichtswissenschaft (2013),
6
 and Doris Gerber, Analytische Metaphysik der Geschichte. 
Handlungen, Geschichten und ihre Erklärung (2012).
7
 Ankersmit devotes an important part 
of the introduction and conclusion of his book to Ranke, but it is not Ranke the historian 
                                                 
4
 The affinity of analytic philosophy to positivism is suggested by Jonathan Wolff in chapter 27 “Analytic 
Political Philosophy” of the Oxford Handbook when he notes on p. 813 “it may often appear that analytic 
philosophy looks towards mathematics and the empirical sciences for models of methodology, whereas 
continental philosophy looks more towards literary and interpretative studies”. The same may be said of 
history too. 
5
 Frank Ankersmit, Meaning, Truth, and Reference in Historical Representation (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2011). 
6
 Jörn Rüsen, Historik: Theorie der Geschichtswissenschaft (Köln, Weimar, Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 2013). 
7
 Doris Gerber, Analytische Metaphysik der Geschichte. Handlungen, Geschichten und ihre Erklärung 
(Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2012). 
Historiografías, 9 (Enero-Junio, 2014): pp.17-30.
 
ISSN 2174-4289                                                     20 
 
but the theorist of history. Only once does he very briefly cite a historical work, Ranke’s 
English History. The main part of the book is devoted to the analysis of a number of 
concepts which he considers to be central to historical representation such as time, 
interpretation, representation, truth, meaning, experience, and subjectivity, dealt with 
purely in the abstract with virtually no reference to how they appear in actual historical 
writings. Rüsen in an excellent Introduction comes closer to what historians do, setting out 
to examine what is meant by history as a “science” (Geschichtswisenschaft), a term with a 
very different meaning in German from English, here in the case of history seen in the 
context of a professional discipline (Fach) as it emerged in the nineteenth century. He is 
fully aware in the Introduction of the challenges which this discipline with its Eurocentric 
orientation has undergone since the 1960s in the face of culturalism and globalism. These 
challenges have led Rüsen to rewrite the earlier formulation of a Historik from the 1980s.
8
 
But once he leaves the Introduction, he proceeds in a way similar to Ankersmit, analyzing 
basic concepts, although these relate more closely to historical study and questions of 
methodology than do those of Ankersmit.
9
 This tendency to deal with history in the abstract 
also marks the work of Doris Gerber. Gerber is less concerned with the analysis of concepts 
than with the question of historical knowledge. She develops her idea of the centrality of 
intentional motivations in history against both structuralist and narrativist approaches to 
history such as those of Karl Marx or Hayden White.
10
 But historians do not appear in her 
book, or in the case of Reinhard Koselleck deal only with his theoretical, not his historical 
writings. The one exception is a brief section on Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s and Jürgen Kocka’s 
theoretical underpinnings of their social history.
11
 All three authors are fully justified in 
dealing with theoretical aspects of historiography, but they proceed on a level of abstraction 
which has little direct applicability to what historians do. My presentation here may sound 
critical, but then the topic of this session is “why has Analytic Philosophy almost 
completely failed to exert any influence on German historical writing or on reflections on 
methodology?” 
 
A very different approach to the analysis of concepts, closer to what historians do, 
was undertaken by the Begriffsgeschichte (history of concepts) in the eight-volume  
Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, historisches Lexikon politisch-sozialer Sprache in 
Deutschland (1973-1997) which aimed at approaching the history of society through an 
                                                 
8
 Jörn Rüsen, Grundzüge einer Historik, 3 vols. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1983-1989). 
9
 Rüsen does cite a number of historians including Johann Gustav Droysen, Jacob Burckhardt, Hans-Ulrich 
Wehler, Saul Friedländer, and Hans Medick, but with a focus on their theoretical pronouncements, again 
without a close analysis of their actual historical writings. Although Rüsen elsewhere has made an important 
contribution in making German and English readers aware of non-Western historical traditions, in his Historik 
he deals almost exclusively with German-language literature, with Hayden White being a notable exception as 
he is also for Doris Gerber, although neither accepts White’s reduction of history to pure narrative. Gerber is 
much more aware of the Anglo-American and French theoretical writings. 
10
 Gerber on Marxismus, Analytische Metaphysik, 147-148, and Wehler and Kocka as representing 
Strukturgeschichte; “Kritik des Narrativismus”, 145-49; Rüsen, Historik, 219-22, Hayden White, 
Metahistory: The Historical Imagination of Nineteenth Century Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press,1973), 222-27.  
11
 On Wehler and Kocka, see Gerber, Analytische Metaphysik der Geschichte, 145-48. Koselleck and White 
are mentioned more extensively, but as theorists; Droysen, who is discussed extensively in Rüsen’s Historik 
(but with reference only to Droysen’s Historik, not his historical works), in Gerber is merely cited among the 
names of several theorists. 
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examination of the underlying concepts which determined social consciousness, 
specifically in Germany in the period from about 1750 to 1850 during which a modern 
discourse was born.
12
 Yet this conceptual approach to history differed markedly from 
analytic philosophy; while analytic philosophy was concerned with the logical analysis of 
concepts independently of their historical context, for Begriffsgeschichte the historical 
context in which concepts relating to social structures are embedded in historical processes 
is basic for historical understanding. 
  
The Politics of “Historismus” and the Rejection of Positivism in Germany between 
1825 and the early 1960s 
  
To understand the transformation of historical methodology and writing after 1945, 
which is the theme of this conference, we have to turn to the tradition of Historism 
(Historismus), to be distinguished from Historicism (Historizismus) as defined by Karl 
Popper in his Poverty of Historicism.
13
 Popper identifies historicism with the belief in 
historical laws as propagated in diverse forms by Hegel, Marx, and the French positivists 
which he identifies with authoritarian political doctrines. He does not discuss the German 
school of Historism (Historismus) which rejects the very idea of causal explanation and 
laws of history.
14
  
 
The term Historism was first used later, but the basic ideas were formulated as early 
as the 1820s by Leopold von Ranke, who is considered the founder of history as an 
academic discipline in Germany.
15
 Ranke wished to elevate history to the rank of a science 
(Wissenschaft), but of a science which took into account the unique character of historical 
studies. “History”, he wrote, “is distinguished from all other sciences in that it also an art. 
History is a science in collecting, finding, penetrating; it is an art because it recreates and 
portrays that which it has found and recognized”.16 He emphatically did not believe that 
history could be reduced to laws. Instead he stressed that the historian must recognize the 
individual character of all historical subject matters and epochs and sought to understand 
them (verstehen) rather than explain them in abstract terms. Only through the immersion 
into the subject matter was an intuitive understanding of the forces operating in history 
possible. He stressed the centrality of the state, as the expression of a moral idea, and its 
right to maintain itself by force in the international struggle for power, but unlike his later 
followers remained committed to a European balance of the great powers rather than 
endorsing Prusso-German nationalism.
17
 
 
                                                 
12
 Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck (eds.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, historisches 
Lexikon politisch-sozialer Sprache in Deutschland, 8 vols. (Stuttgart: Klett, 1972-1997). 
13
 Karl Popper, Poverty of Historicism (New York: Basic Books, 1960). 
14
 He in one sentence writes that historicism should not be confused with Historism without defining what is 
meant by Historism or mentioning a single historian or theorist connected with it, Ibid., 7. 
15
 See Georg G. Iggers, “Historicism”, in Dictionary of the History of Ideas, vol. 2 (New York: Scribner, 
1973-74), 456-64; Iggers, “The History and the Meaning of the Term”, Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 
56 (1995): 129-52. 
16
 Leopold Ranke, “On the Character of Historical Science”, in Leopold von Ranke, The Theory and Practice 
of History, ed. Georg G. Iggers, transl. Wilma A. Iggers (London: Routledge, 2011), 8. 
17
 See Leopold Ranke, “The Great Powers”, Ibid., 29-53. 
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An early concise definition of the central concepts of the philosophic and political 
tradition of Historism as it affected historical writing was contained in Johann Gustav 
Droysen’s article “Erhebung der Geschichte zum Rang einer Wissenschaft” (Raising 
History to the Rank of a Science) in the Historische Zeitschrift in 1862, a critique of Henry 
Thomas Buckle’s History of Civilization in England and with it a rejection of what Droysen 
considered the first attempt to apply positivist notions to the writing of history as advocated 
by Auguste Comte. The positivism of Comte and Buckle should not be confused with 
analytic philosophy as it emerged half a century later, but there are some parallelisms. 
Similarly some analytic philosophers sought the orientation of philosophy to the natural 
sciences, the belief represented by theorists who came from the Vienna Circle like Carl 
Hempel, that the same logic of explanation which applies to the natural sciences also 
applies to philosophic thinking.
18
 Analytic philosophies never accepted the positivist notion 
of historical progress; moreover they were not interested in causal explanation, but in 
analytical procedures.  
 
Droysen draws a harp line between Buckle’s attempt to explain historical events in 
terms of the laws of the physical sciences which for him are inapplicable to a science 
(Wissenschaft) of history which deals with what he describes as “moral communities” 
(sittliche Gemeinsamkeiten). Each of these has its individual character and cannot be 
reduced to abstract terms, but needs to be understood (verstehen). He then proceeds to what 
amounts to a political critique of Buckle’s advocacy of individual liberty and of his view of 
church and state as patronizing interferences (Bevormundung) with the self determination 
of the individual (Bildung). It is rather “in the community of the family, state, and nation 
(Volk) that the individual lifts himself above the limits of his ephemereal self [...] The 
essence of freedom rests not in the unlimited independence of the individual. Without the 
moral powers (sittliche Mächte) it (freedom) amounts to nothing”. Droysen then contrasts 
the picture which Buckle draws of civilization (Zivilisation), with the Bildung which is 
central to German society.
19
 Later historians involved in German war propaganda in World 
War I, contrasted Western civilization (Zivilisation) with German culture (Kultur) and 
praised the latter as superior in its historical understanding of reality as against the 
supposedly positivistic outlook of the West, and with it rejected democratic values as 
against a superior understanding of the world in which freedom is embedded in a state 
which combines freedom with authority.
20
  
 
All this provided an ideological basis for the Prusso-German state, as it was unified 
under Bismarck. This perspective persisted in the face of military defeat in the Weimar 
Republic. Indeed there was a younger generation of democratic historians in the Weimar 
Republic, but they constituted a marginal group forced into emigration when the Nazis 
assumed power.
21
 This is not to say that the historist tradition led to Nazism; the majority of 
historians did not support the Nazi party, but their intense rejection of democracy and 
                                                 
18
 See note 8. 
19
 Johann Gustav Droysen, “Erhebung der Geschichte zum Rang einer Wissenschaft”, in Johann Gustav 
Droysen, Historik: Vorlesungen über Enzyklopädie und Methodologie der Geschichte, ed. Rudolf Hübner 
(München: R. Oldenbourg, 1960), 386-405.   
20
 Thomas Mann, Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen (Berlin: S. Fischer, 1919).  
21
 Gerhard A. Ritter (ed.), Refugee Historians and Friedrich Meinecke: Letters and Documents (Boston: Brill, 
2010). 
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parliamentarism contributed to the demise of the Weimar Republic. And almost all these 
historians supported Nazi foreign policy up to 1939 and the war after that, including 
Friedrich Meinecke, one of the few supporters of the Weimar Republic among the 
historians. Certainly disturbed by the domestic political development in Nazi Germany, 
Meinecke published nevertheless Die Entstehung des Historismus (The Origins of 
Historism) in 1936 while the Nazis were already in power.
22
 The book was a direct critique 
of Enlightenment rationality, showing how in an almost progressive manner, German 
thinkers since Leibniz and Herder replaced the rigid natural law concept of a common 
human nature by a historical philosophy of value which recognized the elements of 
individuality, diversity, and change in historical reality. Now disillusioned about 
Germany’s political development, to which he does not refer here but which he had hailed 
before World War I in Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat, where he stressed the merger of 
Prussian military power and Weimar culture positively, he nevertheless still proclaimed the 
spiritual superiority of German historical thought.
23
 He viewed Historism as it developed in 
Germany as “the highest stage reached until now in the understanding of things human”, 
and Germany’s greatest contribution to European culture since the Reformation.24 
 
To understand why Historism so dominated academic historiography in Germany we 
must look at the way in which the history faculties at the Protestant German universities 
were recruited, which resulted in a historiographical and political consensus.
25
 Except in the 
period of the Nazi and the Communist dictatorships the state intervened less in the writing 
of history than in many other countries. Communist East Germany is a different story as to 
recruitment. Except in East Germany under Communism intervention was seldom 
necessary because there existed a broad consensus on philosophical and political questions 
in accord with the establishment. Not only were Jews and until well into the twentieth 
century women generally excluded from university appointments, but often also Catholics. 
Only seldom were persons of diverse political opinions appointed. The attempt of an 
established historian, Karl Lamprecht, to introduce certain positivist ideas into his German 
History at the turn to the twentieth century was vigorously rebuffed by the historical 
profession, although it was taken seriously by a public outside the universities. Of course, 
there were historians who did not follow the historist paradigm methodologically or 
politically, Marxists but also democratically oriented writers who retold the past as a 
literary endeavor like Emil Ludwig, but they had no place at the university.  
 
The Political and Philosophic Rejection of both Historismus and Analytic Philosophy 
in the Federal Republic of Germany after 1960 
 
The immediate period after 1945 saw a continuation of national traditions of 
historiography in West Germany by an older generation of historians who continued to 
                                                 
22
 Friedrich Meinecke, Entstehung des Historismus (München: R. Oldenbourg, 1936); also Werke III. English, 
Historism: The Rise of a New Historical Outlook (London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1970).  
23
 Friedrich Meinecke, Weltbürgertun und Nationalstaat: Studien zur Genesis des deutschen Nationalstaats 
(Berlin: R. Oldenbourg, 1919). English: Cosmopolitanism and the National State (Princeton University Press, 
1970). 
24
 Friedrich Meinecke, Entstehung des Historismus, Werke III, 4. 
25
 Wolfgang Weber, Priester der Klio: Historisch-sozialwissenschaftliche Studien zur Herkunft und Karriere 
deutscher Historiker zur Geschichte der Geschichtswissenschaft 1800-1970 (Frankfurt: Lang, 1985). 
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dominate the universities. Slightly more critical than most of these historians the aged 
Friedrich Meinecke in his The German Catastrophe essentially defended the German 
intellectual and cultural past even if he now distanced himself from the excessive 
militaristic aspects of Prusso-German nationalism.
26
 A much more critical note appeared in 
1946 in East Germany in Alexander Abusch’s Irrweg einer Nation (The Erroneous Path of 
a Nation) in which he made the failure of Germany to develop democratic institutions 
responsible for the rise of Nazism.
27
 But the East German authorities very soon distanced 
themselves from Abusch’s critical assessment of the German past. For them the rise of 
Nazism was to be understood not as a peculiarly German phenomenon with roots in the 
anti-democratic traditions of Germany’s political thought but as the international product of 
monopoly capitalism. 
 
Yet quite independently of Abusch the idea of a failed German path was also taken up 
by a younger generation of historians in West Germany beginning in the second half of the 
1960s who critically examined the German past to explain the Nazi seizure of power. Hans-
Ulrich Wehler in Das deutsche Kaiserreich (The German Empire) in 1973 argued that 
Germany in the process of industrial modernization had traveled a “special path” 
(Sonderweg) different from that of West European societies and America.
28
 “The 
progressive economic modernization of German society”, he wrote, “should have been 
accompanied by a modernization of social relations and politics. Industrialization in its 
permanent technological revolution should have brought with it a development of a society 
of legally free and politically responsible citizens capable of making their own decisions”, 
which in the German case it definitely did not. This conception of a “special” path to 
modernity was ultimately sharply criticized because it oversimplified the social and 
political development of the West in general and of Germany in particular.
29
 But it marked 
a radical challenge to the historical narrative which had dominated academic history in 
Germany since the early nineteenth century, an end to the hostility against the West and 
Western values, but by now means an acceptance of the positivism inherent in analytic 
philosophy. 
 
Wehler called for the transformation of history into a social science, but a “historical 
social science” (Historische Sozialwissenschaft).30 He relied heavily on Max Weber’s 
conception of a social science. Already in 1884 the Viennese economist Carl Menger in Die 
Irrtümer des Historismus in der deutschen Nationalökonomie (The Errors of Historism in 
German National Economics) had charged that the German historical school of economics 
                                                 
26
 Friedrich Meinecke, Die deutsche Katastrophe: Betrachtungen und Erinnerungen (Wiesbaden, Zurich: E. 
Brockhaus, Aeroverlag, 1946; reprint Wiesbaden: Brockhaus, 1949). English: The German Catastrophe. 
Reflections and Recollections (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1950). 
27
 Alexander Abusch, Der Irrweg einer Nation: Ein Beitrag zum Verständnis deutscher Geschichte (Berlin: 
Aufbau-Verlag, 1960). Despite the fact that the official GDR distanced itself from the book, it was 
republished in 1949 and 1960. 
28
 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Das deutsche Kaiserreich, 1871-1918 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973). 
29
 Geoff Eley and David Blackbourn, The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Culture in 19-Century 
Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 11. 
30
 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Historische Sozialwissenschaft und Geschichtsschreibung (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht, 1980); Georg G. Iggers, Vom Historismus zur Historischen Sozialwissenschaft (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978). 
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of Gustav Schmoller in its attempt to deal with economic processes in the context of a 
specific German culture had avoided formulating the clear concepts necessary for scientific 
research.
31
 Weber criticized the ahistorical level of abstraction on which Menger and 
classical economics operated, but also the lack of clear concepts of the historical school.
32
 
He called for a sociology which sought to formulate clear concepts within their historical 
context.  
 
At the same time a group of historians separate from the Wehler circle in 1973 
launched the multi-volume Begriffsgeschichte, to which we already referred, which aimed 
at approaching the history of society through an examination of the underlying concepts 
which determined social consciousness, specifically in Germany in the period from about 
1750 to 1850 during which a modern discourse was born.
33
 Yet this conceptual approach to 
history differed markedly from both analytic philosophy and historical social science; while 
the former was concerned with the logical analysis of concepts independent of their 
historical context, for the latter the historical context is crucial in which clear concepts 
relating to social structures embedded in historical processes are basic for historical 
understanding. But it also differs fundamentally from the ways of empirical and often 
quantitative methods applied by a large segment of social sciences in America and to a 
lesser extent in Western Europe. 
 
And just as German Historism involved a particular political position, so the 
Historische Sozialwissenschaft viewed itself as actively socially and politically involved. It 
sought to contribute to the construction of a socially oriented democracy. Without generally 
admitting its debt to Marx, historical social science was deeply concerned with the extent of 
social inequality and class structures, while at the same time strongly opposed to 
authoritarian and dogmatic aspects of state socialism as practiced in the Soviet Union and 
its satellites. The opposition to socialist dictatorship and the commitment to liberal 
democracy was shared by most thinkers in the analytic philosophic tradition, Karl Popper is 
a clear example and Bertrand Russell was an outspoken pacifist committed to extensive 
social reform; and although Popper who favored a free market economy and Russell 
differed on this, their philosophy assumed a society in which free communication was 
possible.  Nevertheless they made a clear cut between their political commitments to a free 
society and their philosophy which in its logical analysis was value free while the 
philosophy of German Historische Sozialwisenschaft, also known as the Bielefeld School, 
saw a clear connection between its social theory and its political and social activism. 
 
There is an element of positivism in the attempt by the advocates of a historical social 
science to examine social structures and historical processes empirically, but also a 
conscious attempt to overcome positivism. If Weber represented a major influence, the 
Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School represented another decisive influence.
34
 We have 
                                                 
31
 Carl Menger, Irrtümer des Historismus in der historischen Nationalökonomie (Wien, 1884; reprint Aalen 
Scientia Verlag, 1966).  
32
 Max Weber, “Roscher und Knies und die logischen Probleme der historischen Nationalökonomie”, in 
Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre (Tübingen: Mohl, 1968), 1-145. 
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already seen how Marxist ideas of social inequality and class conflict played an important 
role in the historical social science of the Bielefeld School, modified by the inclusion of 
cultural factors. Consciously moving away from positivist positions, they accepted the 
distinction which Max Horkheimer initiated in 1937 in his essay “Traditional and Critical 
Theory” in which traditional theory is essentially positivistic in accepting the world as it is 
and critical theory examines society in terms of basic values of social equality.
35
 
Horkheimer criticized the “logico-mathematical” prejudice of positivism, and this critique 
would also apply to analytic philosophy, which separates theoretical activity from actual 
life without consideration for ongoing human activities.
36
 These are ideas which are 
integrated into the historical social science of the Bielefeld historians who, however, are 
less involved in philosophic discussions than in writing history, aware of maintaining 
intersubjectively acceptable standards of historical study.  
 
In the period beginning in the 1960s and extending until now Jürgen Habermas 
became the most important representative of critical theory. He developed a theory of what 
he called “communicative” reason which reaffirmed the centrality of human reason which 
has been questioned by postmodern thinkers like Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, and 
sought by “communicative reason” to arrive at a more humane,  just, and egalitarian 
society, which also was the aim of the Bielefeld historians.
37
 Habermas reaffirmed the 
rational values of the Enlightenment and called on Germany to accept the democratic 
values which he saw predominant in the West. His own democratic convictions like those 
of the Bielefeld historians were those of social democracy. 
 
It is important to mention that at this time a fundamental change took place at the 
universities which became much more open in their recruitment of faculty which now 
included women and a greater diversity of opinions, and the admission of students from a 
much broader segment of the population. All this occurred at a time of changes in the 
political climate affected by the student movement of the 1960s. 
 
  
The Cultural Turn in Historical Thought and Its Methodological Implications from 
the 1980s to the 2010s 
 
In a way the diverse social science approaches to history, whether German 
Historische Sozialwissenschaft, French Annales, varieties of Marxism, and American 
Cliometrics, shared with analytic philosophy the concern to formulate generalizations to 
explain social formations, but unlike analytic philosophy sought not logical consistency but 
historical contexts. What joined the various social sciences and analytic philosophy was the 
commitment to rational standards of inquiry subject to validation. As late as 1979 Geoffrey 
Barraclough concluded that the search for quantity is undoubtedly the most powerful of the 
new trends in history, the factor beyond all others which distinguishes historical attitudes in 
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the 1970s from historical attitudes in the 1930s.
38
 In the same year Lawrence Stone in an 
essay “The Revival of Narrative” went in a very different direction, rejecting the illusion of 
“coherent scientific explanation” in history without, however, suggesting that historical 
narrative despite its literary form surrenders its claim to rational inquiry and realistic 
reconstruction.
39
 In Germany the turn to cultural history led in the 1980s to a vigorous 
debate between advocates of social science history, who called for strict conceptual and 
analytical guidelines, and the champions of everyday history for whom these guidelines 
meant the death knell for lived experiences which should be the true subject matter of 
history. The German advocates of an Alltagsgeschichte (every day history) found a pattern 
for their methodological approach in the cultural anthropology of Clifford Geertz of a 
“thick description” which called for an immediate confrontation with an alien culture. The 
advocates of Alltagsgeschichte turned away from the concern of the social sciences with 
large impersonal social structures and historical process and sought a “history from below”, 
of the life experiences of common people. This stress on the every day was not only taken 
up by historians in West Germany, but also by historians in East Germany.
40
 It is clear 
where Alltagsgeschichte stands politically; as advocates of a history from below they stand 
to the left of social democracy, wanting a democracy which stands for the welfare of the 
common people and very conscious of environmental issues. 
 
Two new approaches became important in Germany, but not only in Germany, oral 
history and the history of memory, but differently outside of Germany. Although neither 
could fully rely on traditional accepted standards of evidential scholarship, they 
nevertheless contributed to an understanding of the past. Oral history in Germany 
concentrated on interviews with persons who had experienced the Nazi and Communist 
dictatorships, including survivors of the Holocaust. An important project undertaken by 
Lutz Niethammer and his team in the 1980s interviewed ordinary citizens in the Ruhr 
Valley of West Germany as well as in East Germany on what they experienced in the Nazi 
period.
41
 At the same time an important concern with historical memory arose in Europe 
and in the United States. In France it turned to collective history to reconstruct how the 
French recollected their past, in Germany, but also in Israel, with the founding of the 
journal History and Memory in 1990 it dealt with the memories of individual survivors.
42
  
 
The Status of Historical Writing Today and Its Relation to Analytic Philosophy 
 
In order to receive an oversight of historical writing and theory today, we have looked 
at the 2014 program of the German Historical Association (Deutscher Historikertag) and 
have made some comparisons with the 2014 program of the American Historical 
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Association. In the period from the beginnings of history as an academic discipline in the 
nineteenth century until the late twentieth century there have been major trends to which a 
great deal of German historical writing has conformed, first the nationalist politics oriented 
historiography which dominated until World War II, then various forms of social science 
oriented history, followed toward the end of the twentieth century by the cultural and 
linguistic turn. We find no such dominant trend reflected in the 2014 program of the 
Deutsche Historikertag, instead a greater diversity than before. In fact there is no dominant 
paradigm apparent in the German program, and even greater diversity than before. What is 
the relationship of historical writing and thought to analytic philosophy as reflected in the 
German 2014 program? The answer is none. There is not a single section which deals 
primarily with questions of historical methodology or philosophy of history. The closest are 
sections dealing with the effect of digitalization on history and the role of new media. 
Implicitly elements of a consensus become apparent. None of the sections follow the model 
of the Historische Sozialwissenschaft. The latter was still macro-historical in its 
assumptions of modernization processes and class structures; neither appears to be dealt 
with now. On the other hand, they do not pursue the relativistic epistemological 
implications of the Alltagsgeschichte with its turn to micro-history. There is no recourse to 
the attempts of Hayden White to emphasize the fictional character of all historical 
narratives. Instead the sections appear to accept a high degree of historical realism. 
 
Unlike the American programs, the programs of the Historikertage are organized 
around a problem. The problem for the 2008 Historikertag was the role of inequality in 
history, the one of the 2010 program with borders and the overcoming of borders, 2012 the 
conflict about resources, and 2014 winners and losers in history. Many of the sections, 
however, actually do not deal closely with these problems. But several things become clear 
from the formulation of these topics. The main concern is with contemporary issues. 
Nationalism is dead, as is any identification with the nation. On the other hand, it is striking 
how in contrast to the American program for 2014, the historical perspective in almost all 
sections is centered on Europe, with an occasional inclusion of the United States. Although 
most sections deal with the twentieth century, a few trace history back to the medieval and 
early modern periods, but always in Europe. Again unlike the American program there are 
only two sections which deal with colonialism and post-colonialism. One section deals with 
the divergence between European and Chinese developments, two with the reintegration of 
Soviet veterans of the Afghan war into Soviet society. It is surprising how little attention is 
paid to the Holocaust: two deal with the fate of German Jewish refugees, two with the Nazi 
occupation of Eastern Europe. Questions of ethnicity do not play a direct role, they do to an 
extent in the sections devoted to migration. A very striking contrast is the absence of 
concern with questions of sexuality which play a major role in the American program; there 
is only one section devoted to questions of sexuality, one to homosexuality, and although 
many women participate in the program, there is no section which can be described as 
feminist. 
 
Conclusion  
 
There is in fact very little contact between historians writing history and analytic 
philosophers. This has something to do with the extreme departmentalization of academic 
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studies despite the call for interdisciplinary approaches. Both have a good deal to learn 
from each other. The very fact that there is so little contact justifies this conference and this 
paper to explore ways in which this separation of analytic philosophy and historical studies 
may be lessened, even if not overcome. This paper has tried to show how far practicing 
historians have been from clearly examining the theoretical bases of their work. They can 
thus learn from analytic philosophy. On the other hand the analytical philosophers 
discussed in the Oxford Handbook need to realize to a larger extent that all thought takes 
place in a historical and social context. Thus the discussion which we are undertaking at 
this conference has a definite purpose. 
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